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ABSTRACT 
We collect information about how financial factors affects innovation in a company, 
we focus on papers that have studied how innovation, measure by patents granted to a firm 
and non-self citations of those patents, is affected when a company goes public, when the 
stock present high liquidity and if the type of investors play an important role. Also we 
study, if laws and regulation regarding credit supply and anti takeover laws impacts 
innovation.  
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Introduction 
An enterprise has a life cycle, the same way as almost everything else, they start, 
grow, mature, and if they don’t find a way to survive, they die. So, a company must achieve 
self-sustainability to keep attracting new customers, improving and releasing new products 
and services, and this is why innovation is key in an enterprise. However, innovation is not 
an easy task, it requires enterprises to invest time and capital in research and development, 
this could take long periods and considerable amount of money. Keeping that in mind, we 
would like to know which financial factors have an impact on innovativeness, and specially 
which ones affects it in a positive way, for example the sources of capital used (internal or 
external), if the company is public or private and the accounting reporting decisions.  
As is known, our topic of how financial factors affects innovation is very extensive, 
we are going to focus on the following 5 perspectives of our topic:  
❖ How being a private or public company affects innovation? 
❖ What is the effect of stock liquidity on innovation?  
❖  Is innovativeness affected by the type of investors that own the company? 
❖ Effect of hostile takeovers on innovation 
❖ Deregulation and banking development effect on innovation 
In the following sections, we are going to cite 5 papers that captures differents financial 
factors and their effect on innovation, in where we can see the effect of each of the 
perspectives named before. For each, we have the hypothesis and a brief summary of the 
model used and results obtained. To finish, in the last section of the papers there is a 
conclusion.  
1. Does going public affect innovation? Bernstein (2014) 
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 So the first one will be evaluating how going public affects innovation. This helps us 
understand the difference between companies that went public on a certain moment of time, 
and companies that started its IPO’s and withdrawned it, remaining private. This is very 
important because we can determine the relationship between the transition to public equity 
market and the access to capital, and the company's innovation after their IPO’s.  In other 
words, in this case it is seen how the priority for innovation of a company changes when the 
company goes public. 
Since, being a public company gives the firms a better access to capital, one can expect that 
a public company invest more in innovation because of the less financing constraints that it 
would have if it were private. However, usually listed companies face more agency 
problems, meaning that managers might behave and make decisions in their own benefit and 
not in the benefit of the company or the shareholders, which can mitigate innovation, for 
example if managers decide not to invest in R&D expenses in order to show a better profit, 
so they could receive a bonus.  
Model 
 
For this purpose, the author considers three dimensions of the innovation activity that are 
taking into account: the creation of internally generated innovation, the productivity and 
mobility of individual investors, and the acquisition of external innovation. For this 
discussion, the model used is the following; 
𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌1 + 𝑌1𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌1𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌
′ 𝑌1 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌1𝑌 
Where 𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌is the average innovation performance in the five years after the IPO filing 
(average scaled citations , average scaled originality/generality, and average scaled number 
of patents per year), 𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌is the equivalent measure in the three years prior to the IPO filing, 
8 
and 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 is a dummy variable of interest, indicates whether a filer goes public or remains 
private. It also includes, industry (𝜈𝑌) and IPO filing year (𝜇𝑌) fixed effects. 
Nevertheless, 𝛽
1
can be biased, taking into account that the decision of withdrawn the IPO 
could had been taken because some of the innovation policies or opportunities. These 
problem of endogeneity was solved instrumenting the IPO completion choice using 
NASDAQ return for the two month of the book-building phase (the two-month window was 
arbitrary). In any case, since the length of the book-building phase is correlated with the 
likelihood of withdrawing, it was chosen a fixed window shorter than the average period. 
The first-stage regression model was the following; 
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌2 + 𝑌2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌2𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌
′ 𝑌2 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌2𝑌 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌is the instrumental variable. Then the initial model, that is the second-stage 
equation is going to be; 
𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌3 + 𝑌3𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌̂ + 𝑌3𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌
′ 𝑌3 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌3𝑌 
and 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌̂ are the predicted values of the first- stage regression. 
The data used was taking from different sources as follows:  
- IPO filings (application for an IPO and withdraws) from 1985 to 2003 collected 
using Thomson Financial’s SDC New Issues database. the author excluded IPO 
filing of financial firms, unit offers, closed-end funds, ADRs, limited partnerships, 
special acquisition vehicles and spin-offs.  
- National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database is used to match 
patents to firms that complete the IPO Filing and withdrawn IPO filings. The sample 
was restricted to firms with at least one successful patent application between 3 years 
before and five years after the IPO filing.  
- NBER patent database and Harvard Business School (HBS) patent database (after 
2006) was used to calculate the citations a patent received.  
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- Financial info of IPO firms was taken from COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ, while 
financial info of withdraw firms was taken from initial registration statements.  
Performance 
Table 1 shows the innovation novelty of the firms, in where are found 3 different ways they 
approach this situation. First, they used a OLS with the endogenous problem in column 1 
that shows no difference between IPO firms and withdrawn ones. In column 2, it is found 
the reduced-form in which is substituted the independent variable IPO for the NASDAQ 
returns, This result is significant and show the impact that the instrument on IPO completion 
choice, which is a negative correlation, but this result is not intuitive, because it wasn’t 
expected that the short-term NASDAQ return had this effect on long-term innovation. In 
column 3 it was estimated by 2SLS, this coefficient is significant and equals to -0.831, it 
implies that the average of scaled citation of IPO firms is reduced in 43.51%, this is 
calculated dividing the coefficient in the average scaled citation in the years before the event 
that is 1.91. Finally column 4 it is calculated by the quasi-maximun likehood (QML) Poisson 
model and has similar results than the 2SLS.        
 
Table 11 
Dependant 
Variable Model 
(1) Scaled 
Citations 
OLS 
(2) 
Scaled 
Citation
s OLS 
(3) Scaled 
Citations 
2SLS 
(4) Scaled 
Citations 
Poisson 
IPO -0,019  -0,831** -0,980** 
(0,069)  (0,409) (0,427) 
NASDAQ  -0,498**   
                                               
1 Bernstein H 2015. Does Going Public Affect Innovation? The journal of finance VOL. 
LXX, NO. 4 Pag. 1384 
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returns          (0,239)   
Magnitude -1,02%  -43,51% -52,41% 
Observations 1079 1079 1079 1079 
R2 0,239 0,242 0,128 0,148 
Filing year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 2 shows if the reduce of patent citations is related to a change in the nature of the 
project. The important finding on this subject is that the average of originality of firms that 
complete the IPO declines taking into account the negative correlation and significant of the 
coefficient of the 2SLS. And in the generality measure, all the results are not significant. 
Table 22 
Dependant 
Variable 
Model 
(1) 
Scaled 
Originali
ty OLS 
(2) Scaled 
Originality 
OLS 
(3) 
Scaled 
Original
ity  
2SLS 
(3) 
Scaled 
Generalit
y OLS 
(4) Scaled 
Generality 
OLS 
(5) 
Scaled 
Generali
ty  2SLS 
IPO -0,006   -0,137** -0,001   -0,087 
(0,010)  (0,068) (0,016)  (0,092) 
NASDAQ 
returns 
 -0,081**   -0,050  
  (0,036)     (0,051)   
Magnitude -0,10%   -13,00% 0,00% -52,41% -8,00% 
Observation
s 
1079 1079 1079 1079 1079 1079 
                                               
2 Bernstein H 2015. Does Going Public Affect Innovation? The journal of finance VOL. 
LXX, NO. 4 Pag. 1385 
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R2 
0,231 0,234 0,102 0,226 0,226 0,206 
Filing year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
            
And table 3 is explaining if the reduce of novelty is driven by low-quality projects or lower-
impact topics. But, as seen in the table, the only significant coefficient is the endogenous 
one, which mean that is biased and it can not be taken into account. 
Table 33 
Dependant 
Variable Model 
(1) Scaled 
Patents 
OLS 
(2) Scaled 
Patents 
OLS 
(3) Scaled 
Patents  
2SLS 
(3) Scaled 
Patents 
Poisson 
IPO 0,268**  -0,200 0,002 
(0,066)  (0,474) (0,662) 
NASDAQ returns  0,127   
 (0,305)   
Magnitude 37,75%  28,17% 0,28% 
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 
R2 0,184 0,178 0,184 0,168 
Filing year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
                                               
3 Bernstein H 2015. Does Going Public Affect Innovation? The journal of finance VOL. 
LXX, NO. 4 Pag 1386 
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In this first paper, it was found that usually when a firm goes public, innovation experiments 
a reduction compared to firms that initially filed their IPO filing but then withdraw. 
However, once a company is public, usually they can increase access to capital, which 
allows them to acquire new technologies and get new human capital, which can become 
their new source of innovation.  
Here, we can see that, financial factors such whether a firm is private or public, affects 
innovation, precisely in a negative way once the company goes from private to public. .  
2. Does stock liquidity enhance or impede firm innovation? (Fang, Tian and Tice 2011) 
Another important perspective is to analyze how stock liquidity affects a firm’s innovation, 
this is because in literature we found that there are two points of view. The first one says 
that, liquidity of a stock enhance firms innovation because facilitates the entry of 
blockholders (e.g., Maug (1998), Edmans (2009)). This position is based on the facts that 
blockholders collects private information and trades based on this information, making the 
market prices efficient. Also, blockholders would monitor in an active way, which help 
mitigate managerial myopia, so this can make managers sacrificed short-term profits to 
invest in long-term investment like innovation. 
However, if blockholders collect information that tell them “not to invest or not to keep the 
investment”, it would be easy for them to leave. Since, it is easy for them to exit, they might 
no longer care about monitoring the company closely, and this can put pressure on managers 
to show short-term profits, to avoid the exit of the investors.       
Additionally, high liquidity can make a takeover easy to attempt, so the managers has an 
incentive to pursue short-term profits, to avoid the stock to be undervalue (e.g., Stein (1988), 
Shleifer and Summers (1988), Kyle and Villa (1991)). As well, high liquidity helps the entry 
and exit of institutional investors, pursue short-term performances that leads to invest in 
13 
firms with higher expected earning in the following years (e.g., Bushee (1998), Bushee 
(2001), Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005)).  
Model 
 
In this paper, the authors also take the data (firm year patent and citation of patents) from the 
NBER database, to calculate stock liquidity measures intradays trades and quotes were taken 
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, and information for the control variables comes 
for several sources that give financial statement items. It is important to say, that only firms 
continuously traded in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for 6 months minimum between 1994 
and 2005 were taken into account.  
In order to measure innovation, it is taken the number of a firm patent applications filed in a 
year that are granted, also it is taken into account the number of  non-self citations each 
patent receives in subsequent years. Because of the right skewed distribution of patents 
counts and its citations, it is used the natural logarithm for both measures.  
This positions entails to prove whether the stock liquidity enhance or impede firms 
innovation. To do so, it was estimated the following model; 
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌+𝑌(𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌+𝑌)
= 𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌 + 𝑌′𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+ 𝑌𝑌,𝑌  
where i indexes firms, and t indexes time and n equal one, two or three (depending on the 
year). 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌+𝑌 refers to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents 
filed and granted, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 refers to the natural logarithm of non-self citations per 
patent,  ILLIQ stands for the liquidity measure: relative effective spread (absolute value of 
the difference between the execution price and the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask 
14 
quote), CONTROLS are the characteristics of a firm that can affect innovation productivity 
such as market capitalization, profitability, asset tangibility, leverage among others.  
As it is seen there are some control variables, these control variables are to solve the 
problem of simultaneity between stock liquidity and innovation. The solution was to make 
some tests during periods surrounding exogenous shocks to liquidity changes in the 
minimum tick size using a difference-in-difference (DiD). This changes are quasi-natural 
experiments because it affects directly to the stock liquidity and exhibits variation in the 
cross-section of stocks ( Bessembinder (2003), Furfine (2003)). Nevertheless, those changes 
will not affect innovation. Also, changes in expected future innovation does not influence 
the cross-sectional changes in liquidity that was induced by the changes in tick size.   
Performance 
The following table (table 4) is divided in two, the first part shows that, there is no 
statistically significant difference, between the control and the treatment group. Also, to 
make sure there is no unobservable omitted variable bias, there was taken the change of tick 
size from 8ths to 16ths in 1997. The second part of the table, is where the DiD is estimated, 
and what is found was that the number of patents and the number of citation per patent has a 
negative correlation with the shock in liquidity, it decrease in 4.6 and 4.7 respectively, in the 
three-year period immediately the shock. 
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Table 44
  
For table 5, there were created 3 new variables, PILOT, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the firm is in the decimalization pilot program, and zero if not, YR_2000, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the year 2000 and zero for 1999, and the 
interaction of both of them PILOTxYR_2000. This is for the case of decimalization in the 
year 2000. The result show that the coefficient of the interaction of variables, due to the 
number of patents is significant and has a negative correlation, which means that the number 
of patents is reduced in 48.5% for the firms in the pilot. In column 2 is found the number of 
citation, and the results were that the number of citation for the pilot ones is, is significant at 
10% level, and 30.9% lower than the ones that don’t participated in the pilot. On the other 
                                               
4 Fang W, Tian X and Tice S 2014. Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm 
Innovation? The journal of finance VOL. LXIX, NO. 5. 
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hand, the coefficient of PILOT is also significant, but positive which means that is a 
difference between the number of citation for pilot and non pilot firms before the switched 
to decimal pricing.    
  Table 55       
 
At the end, the authors conclude that there is a negative relationship between stock liquidity 
and firm innovation, there is also a negative and causal relationship between stock liquidity 
and future innovation by using decimalization. which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
due to the pressure that managers of high liquidity stock have to make profit in short-term, 
they do not invest in innovation, while illiquidity stocks enhance innovation.  
3. Innovation and institutional Ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales 2009) 
Another important factor that affect innovation of a firm, is the type of investors that own 
the company, focusing more on institutional investors. The main hypothesis is that 
institutional ownership has a positive impact on R&D and its productivity.  
In this paper, the authors use two models to prove their hypothesis. The first one says that 
institutional investor force managers to innovate (e.g., Hart (1983), Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)). The other one talks about the concern of the manager on the 
possibility of getting fired, due to the investment in R&D that leads to incurring in new risk 
                                               
5  Fang W, Tian X and Tice S 2014. Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm 
Innovation? The journal of finance VOL. LXIX, NO. 5. 
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for the firm, this could generate, by random circumstances, bad results in the future, 
however institutional investors will increase monitoring in order to incentive managers to 
invest in long-term projects and  make them abandon their fear of getting fired, due to a 
short-term revenues. 
Model 
 
To approach and identify how institutional ownership affects a firm's innovation, taking into 
account the actual productivity of the innovation process. To do this, it was used the next 
model; 
𝑌(𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝑌𝑌,𝑌𝑌) = 𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 is a count-based measure of innovation (i.e., future cite-weighted 
patents) of firm i in period t, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 is the proportion of stock owned by institutions, 
𝑌𝑌𝑌are some control variables, 𝜂𝑌is a firm fixed effect, and 𝜏𝑌is a time dummies.  
There was a concern about a bias due to an omitted variable, the firm value. This problem 
was control in several ways. First the control variables that were taken into account, are 
correlated with the firm's value like sales, capital intensity, and fixed effects. Also the 
explicitly condition of the stock market-based proxies of the firm, in this case Tobin’s 
average q.  
Another problem that is concern about this model is a endogeneity of institutional 
ownership, given that the correlation of this and innovation can be driven by the selection. 
To solve this, there was consider an instrumental variable, the firm’s addition to the S&P 
500 index. This dummy takes the value of one if the firm is a member of the index. The 
addition to the S&P 500 has an impact on the institutional ownership, given that fund 
managers are benchmarked against this index, increasing it. Nevertheless, is rare that this 
have an effect on the innovation of the firm. 
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Data used in this study is taking from the following sources:  
- Accounting information of U.S. publicly listed firms since mid 1950s is taking from 
Compustat. Here we have information of R&D expenditures.  
-  Patents granted and citations of each patent from the NBER 
- Ownership data like number of institutional owner, number of stock issue and the 
participation of each institutions is taking from text files of Compact Disclosure. 
This data was matched with Bushee (1998) classification of institutions to see if 
depending on the type of institutional owner there are different effects on innovation.  
- Data compiled by Fisman, Khurana and Rhodes-Kroppf (2005) was used to get 
information about CEO exits (whether he was fired or not) and other characteristics 
of the management. 
- Listings by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) was used to get data 
related to corporate governance and state laws against hostile takeovers.  
Performance 
The result in table 6 shows three different methodologies, the first two columns correspond 
to OLS regressions, the following three columns are results from Poisson regressions, and 
the final part is negative binomial regression. In all three cases, the institutional ownership 
has a positive effects on innovation. In average, an increase in 10% in institutional 
ownership, will increase in 7% increases in the probability of obtaining an additional cite-
weighted patent. As important of this, all the controls were significant and have a positive 
relationship, which mean that for an improvement due to an increase in institutional 
ownership, it is necessary more than that taking into account that is a small proportion of the 
real impact in innovation. 
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Table 66 
 
 
Since institutional investors actively monitor more and care about long-term investments, 
they make managers feel sure about their career and not be afraid to invest in R&D even if 
that generates low profits. In this paper was found a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and innovation.       
4. Do hostile takeovers stifle innovation? Evidence from antitakeover legislation and 
corporate patenting (Atanassov) 
Continuing with factors that affects innovation, it was found that external pressure have an 
impact on it. In the specific how does hostile takeovers, which is the most extreme, affect 
innovation. In literature it is found a contrasting between two main theories, the first one 
induce that hostile takeovers has a positive impact on innovation, due to the threat that 
hostile takeovers represent for managers, it discipline the manager and focus him to invest in 
the more valuable project, even though that they are a long-term projects and they affect 
short-term results, it also make him react efficiently toward technological changes. 
Otherwise, there are some arguments against this position, one argue that hostile acquirer 
can dismissed the manager after the innovation is conceived, getting all the profits without a 
                                               
6 Aghion P, Van Reenen J, and Zingales L. 2013. Innovation and Institutional 
Ownership. American Economic Review 2013, 103(1): 277–304 
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prior investment. The other one, focus on the asymmetry in information in long-term 
innovatives projects, ones that are difficult to measure and can make shareholders 
undervalue the stock leading to an easy and cheap hostile takeover. 
Model 
 
To prove whether takeovers have a positive or negative influence on innovation, which is 
the main purpose of this paper, it was used the antitakeover laws to have a exogenous 
decreased in the threats of hostile takeovers, and measure the impact on innovation. To do 
so, it was used the next model;                 
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑌+𝑌) = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌   
where 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑌+𝑌)is 𝑌𝑌𝑌(1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) or 𝑌𝑌𝑌(1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌/
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌), and 𝑌is the number of years after the current period 𝑌, and is equal to 
three or four, BCst is a dummy variable equal to one if an antitakeover law has been enacted 
by time t in state s, Xiskt is a vector of control variables that are total asset, sales, industry 
SIC, R&D expenditures, book equity, book debt, net PPE, operating income, firm age, and 
book to market, also to control for time-invariant unobservable firms characteristics was 
used a firm fixed effect, 𝛽
𝑌
, and for economy-shocks, 𝛼𝑌, as well i indexes firms, s indexes 
the state of incorporation, k indexes the state of location, and t indexes time. 
To control any type of endogeneity, it was perform a test that proof that the anti takeover 
laws are exogenous to most of the firms. This statement was validated performing a 
regression that show if the decline on innovation was before the enactment of the law. For 
this there were introduced four dummy variables that shown the time before and after the 
enactment of the law.  
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𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+ 𝑌1𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
−2𝑌𝑌−1 + 𝑌2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
0
+ 𝑌3𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+1 + 𝑌4𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
≥+2 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌  
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
−2𝑌𝑌−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if its 1 or 2 years before an 
antitakeover law passed,  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
0 is a dummy variable equal to one if is the year 
when the law passed, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+1 is the dummy variable equal to one if it is one year after 
the law passed, and 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
≥+2is a dummy variable equal to one if it is two or more years 
after the law passed. The important result that was found, and explained why there is no 
endogeneity, is that the coefficient of the dummy variable 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
−2𝑌𝑌−1was 
statistically insignificant and small for number of patents and the number of citation per 
patent. 
Performance 
In the table 7 is found the results of the models that there were calculated. In the first three 
columns are the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents, in the other three is the 
logarithm of one plus the number of patents divided number of citation. This results are 
consistent taking into account that the coefficient of Before are not statistically significant 
which means that the decreases in innovation where not before the enact of the law, with this 
it can be confirm that this shock solve the endogeneity problem. Now the important result 
was in the After coefficient, which are statistically significant and negative, for both of the 
dependent variables. It means is that innovation is negatively affected by this shock but this 
effect take time to affect it.    
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Table 77
 
In this paper it was concluded that there is a positive relationship between hostile takeovers 
and innovation, since it was shown that companies settled in states that have approved anti 
takeover laws have innovated less (measure by the number of citations per patents) than 
companies located in states with no such laws.  
5. Credit supply and corporate innovation (Amore, Schneider and Zaldokas 2013) 
Usually entrepreneurs look for venture and private capital to finance their projects when 
they are just starting because they try to have instruments that offer only the upside risk, 
                                               
7 Atanassov J 2013. Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from 
Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting. The journal of finance VOL. 
LXVIII, NO. 3 
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taking into account that getting a credit to finance a project that has a lot of uncertainty is not 
a good idea because if things go bad, they will lose more than its capital   
In this paper, the authors, however, find that banking deregulation and credit supply have a 
positive effect on innovation, more specifically in technological development.  
So to finish this discussion, we need to establish the relationship between innovation and 
credit supply, this topic has been controversial, because it is, by theory, with access to 
capital there will be more innovation, and it is needed proof to know exactly how does credit 
supply affects innovation. For this purpose innovation was measured by successful patent 
applications.  
Model 
To determine the relation between credit supply and innovation, it was needed to solve some 
problems that are related to the characteristics of the markets or the industry which could 
affect firm’s innovation and credit supply availability. To solve this, it was taken an 
exogenous shock in the market, that will affect only credit supply and did not affect 
innovation. This shock was the expansion of the U.S. banking industry across states, this due 
to interstate banking deregulation during the 80s and 90s. Now, to know how does credit 
supply affects innovation, it was used the next model; 
𝑌[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌]
= 𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑌𝑌
+ 𝑌𝑌)  
Where interstate deregulationjt is a dummy variable that equal one if a firm is headquartered 
in a state j that has passed an interstate banking deregulation by time t. Also the variable 
𝜏𝑌was included in order to control for aggregate trends, taking into account that US 
patenting activity had a high increased in the mid- 1980s. In their study, they also try to 
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control for other different like firm age, asset tangibility, access to bank credit and return to 
asset among other.  
Data was taken from the NBER to get information of the granted patents between 1976 and 
1995 and firm-level data was taken from Compustat. it is important to note that firms from 
Delaware and South Dakota, firms with negative or zero book value of assets and firms 
headquartered outside the U.S. were excluded. Companies from the financial sector, utilities 
and software industry were also excluded.      
Performance 
In table 8, we can see the results of this paper, having patent counts as a dependant variable 
and a poisson regression 
Table 88 
  
The author run several regression controlling for different factors in each one, for example 
in the 1st column we can see, it was only taken into account firm and year fixed effects, in 
the 2nd regression Logarithm of sales and Capital to labor ratio were also controlled 
                                               
8 Amore M, Schneider C, and Zaldokas A 2013. Credit supply and corporate 
innovation. Journal Financial Economics 109 835-855 
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variables, while in the 3rd and 4th regressions Logarithm of the stock of R&D was also 
taking into account.  
It is seen that deregulation coefficient is significant, and it is statistically and economically 
relevant. This means that there is a positive effect of deregulation on innovation. It is also 
seen that R&D have a positive relationship with innovation (measure by patents).  
Conclusion 
In all the papers studied, we have seen that innovation plays an important role in companies. 
Innovation was measured mainly by the number of patents and number of citations of each 
patent that a company has obtained.  
We can concluded that different financial factors can affect in either, positive or negative, 
way innovation in a firm. Since, a company that goes public and companies with high stock 
liquidity face more pressure from the market, these factors have a negative relationship with 
innovation. However, when the company is owned mainly by institutional investors who 
monitor actively and care for long-term investments, innovation would improve as the 
managers can invest more in R&D.  
We have also seen that when there is no laws and regulation related to take overs and credit 
supply, corporate innovation is higher than in companies that face high and strict 
regulations.  
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